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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 3, 2006, an American military aircraft dropped a precision-
guided munition (PGM) on a house near Baiji, Iraq, 150 miles north of
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Baghdad. The house was thought to be an insurgent redoubt, but media reports
indicated the strike was in error; an Iraqi family of twelve was killed,
including women and children.1 Although a military spokesman emphasized
the great care with which targets are selected, American military
reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities are so advanced that efforts to
explain such tragic events as mechanical or human errors have sometimes
been met with skepticism.
Some have gone as far as to allege intentionality-claiming that the U.S.
military technology that has performed so brilliantly in wars in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the former Yugoslavia is just too good to permit good-faith
mistakes. During the Kosovo war, for example, Chinese officials claimed that
the May 7, 1999, destruction of Beijing's embassy in Belgrade by a B-2
stealth bomber armed with global positioning system (GPS)-guided bombs
could not have been the "tragic mistake" that then-CIA Director George Tenet
attributed to "basic failures . . . of systems and procedures that are used to
identify and verify potential targets."
2
More credible and significant, however, have been accusations that the
American military has, in essence, used its advanced capabilities negligently.
In response to civilian deaths in recent wars, Human Rights Watch has said
that U.S. efforts to verify targets for precision strikes "have not been
sufficiently rigorous, to date, to avoid substantial harm to civilians. The
standard of care should be higher."
3
Obeying the law of war has long been official U.S. policy, 4 and on
balance the U.S. military has an exemplary record regarding the care with
which it employs force. Precisely because of its impressive equipment,
1. Ellen Knickmeyer & Salih Saif Aldin, U.S. Raid Kills Family North of Baghdad, WASH.
POST, Jan. 4, 2006, at A 12, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/01/03/AR2006010300524.html.
2. Statement on the Belgrade Chinese Embassy Bombing: Open Hearing Before the H.
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 106th Cong. (July 22, 1999) (statement of George Tenet, Dir.
of Cent. Intelligence), available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/public affairs/speeches/1999/dci speech_
072299.html. See generally Elisabeth Rosenthal, Public Anger Against U.S. Still Simmers in Beying,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1999, at A11.
3. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ISSUES IN A POTENTIAL
WAR IN IRAQ (Briefing Paper, Feb. 20, 2003), http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/iraq0202003
.htm#6 [hereinafter HRW].
4. Last year the Department of Defense (DoD) re-issued its core LOAC training order. See
DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 231 1.01E, LAW OF WAR PROGRAM § 4.1 (May 9, 2006). The Department's
LOAC training guidance was first issued in 1974 after the My Lai massacre in Vietnam. See Colin H.
Kahl, How We Fight, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 83, 85.
5. This impression is not widely shared among the global public. A June 2003 Pew Global
Attitudes survey found that the view that the United States "didn't try hard enough" to avoid civilian
casualties during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was widely shared-including by more than 90 percent of
Jordanians, Moroccans, and Palestinians. PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, VIEWS
OF A CHANGING WORLD 24-25 (June 2003), available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/l85.pdf. It is
unlikely that attitudes apparent in 2003 would have improved over the course of four more years of a
war that has claimed tens of thousands of lives. For discussion of Iraqi casualty figures, see Kahl, supra
note 4, at 86-87.
In contrast, one scholar who recently studied U.S. LOAC compliance in Iraq concludes that
"despite some dark spots on its record, the U.S. military has done a better job of respecting
noncombatant immunity in Iraq than is commonly believed . .. [and] has been improving." Id. at 84.
"All told, the number of civilian deaths per ton of air-delivered munitions during major combat in Iraq"
was a small fraction of what it was in World War II, reflecting advances in technology but produced
primarily by abandonment of World War II-era "intentional efforts to destroy enemy morale" by
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training, and professionalism, however, the American military is often
politically held to a higher operational standard, and there has been discussion
of whether it should be held to a higher legal standard as well. 6 It is
conceivable that future apologies for "collateral damage" will not only be met
with skepticism but also with calls for those responsible to be prosecuted for
war crimes. The aggrieved may argue: Under the laws of war, it was
criminally negligent for a military with such revolutionary technology-and
thus unprecedented ability to adhere to legal requirements of necessity,
discrimination, 7 proportionality, and humanity in the use of force-to have
caused collateral damage, even unintentionally.
From the post-World War II war crimes trials, to the ad hoc international
criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to the trial of
Saddam Hussein, the past six decades have witnessed repeated efforts to hold
commanders accountable (directly and via command responsibility) for
deliberate attacks on non-combatants. To date, however, no international war
crimes litigation has focused on purely accidental violations of the laws of war
attributed to negligent use of the advanced technology that has brought about
the American "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA), 8 now often referred to
by the shorthand appellation "Transformation."
9
The criticisms offered by Human Rights Watch and others makes
exploration of technology's impact on jus in bellum warranted, with an eye
toward the theoretical possibility that litigation might one day be initiated on
bombing population centers. Id. at 88. For discussion of changes in targeting philosophy, see SAHR
CONWAY-LANZ, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AMERICANS, NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY, AND ATROCITY
AFTER WORLD WAR 11 (2006).
6. For example, as the war on terrorism started in late 2001, a conference of senior American
national security experts "debated whether Western militaries should be held to a higher standard of
performance and conformity with international law." Jennifer M. Hazen, Humanitarian Challenges in
Military Intervention Workshop 6 (2001) (Carr Ctr. for Hum. Rts. Pol'y, John F. Kennedy Sch. of
Gov't, Harvard Univ.), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%2OPapers/
WebNovConf.report.pdf.
7. The terms "distinction" or "identification" are often used in place of "discrimination." See,
e.g., ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE, OPERATIONS LAW FOR RAAF COMMANDERS 51 (2004), available
at http://www.raaf.gov.au/airpower/html/publications/doctrine/aap 1003/lowres/Ch6.pdf.
8. For discussion of the RMA by one of its foremost Pentagon architects, see generally
WILLIAM A. OWENS WITH ED OFFLEY, LIFTING THE FOG OF WAR (2000); Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & William
A. Owens, America's Information Edge, 75 FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 20; William A. Owens,
The Once and Future Revolution in Military Affairs, JOINT FORCE Q., Summer 2002, at 55-61
[hereinafter Owens, The Once and Future Revolution]. Owens was Sixth Fleet Commander during the
1991 Persian Gulf War and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1994 to 1996.
9. "Transformation" is the name given to the broad agenda of technological, organizational,
and doctrinal change in the U.S. military led by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld during his 2001-
2006 tenure and continued under his successor Robert M. Gates. See DEP'T OF DEFENSE, 2006
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT (2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/
Report2006O2O3.pdf; DEP'T OF DEF., 2001 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT (Sept. 30, 2001).
As Owens explains, the 2001-to-present Transformation effort is an effort to recapture the initiative of
an earlier phase of the RMA, which was reflected in Joint Vision 2010, the Joint Chiefs' 1996
"conceptual template for how America's Armed Forces will ... leverage technological opportunities to
achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting." Owens, The Once and Future Revolution,
supra note 8, at 57-58; JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT VISION 2010, at 1 (1996)
[hereinafter JOINT VISION 2010].
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this basis.10 Accordingly, this Note will ask: Is technological transformation
also transforming legal responsibilities regarding accidents in war?
My answer proceeds in Part II by describing the law of armed conflict
(LOAC) as including proscriptive and prescriptive zones, in the latter of
which combatants bear a duty of care. Part I! reviews the jurisprudential basis
of this duty, while Part IV examines treaty sources and state practice.
Combatants are strictly subject to this duty of care, but I argue that
performance carries what lawyers would recognize as a negligence standard-
albeit an uncertain one.
Part V explores the idea of a "reasonable combatant" and explains that
under LOAC's duty of care, as in negligence law under tort and agency,
responsibility for effects generally varies with control. Advanced military
technology on a prima facie level increases the potential ability of combatants
to control the application of force. However, this obligation to exert as much
control as is reasonably possible over effects cannot equal a duty of perfect
effects. A standard regarding unintended harm to noncombatants akin to strict
liability is not compatible with the nature of war, and could have perverse
consequences. As I explain in Section V.D, the availability of better military
technology does not demand abandonment of a negligence standard. Rather,
to stimulate further exploration of the negligence standard, I suggest
understanding LOAC's duty of care in fiduciary terms. Although the analogy
is far from perfect, combatants are in an important respect analogous to
trustees: even in the wartime service of the nations that are their principals,
they remain obligated to act reasonably in the interests of LOAC's
beneficiaries-noncombatants, their property, and prisoners.
Finally, Part VI offers several brief thoughts on potential adjudicatory
challenges for, and implications of, any war crimes prosecutions related to
negligence in the use of RMA systems. Although criminal negligence as a
LOAC doctrine may be too undefined to be a basis for prosecutions in its own
right, duty of care analysis could inform courts-martial proceedings for more
common infractions such as dereliction of duty or "conduct unbecoming."
And not for noncombatant harm alone; duty of care analysis might inform
national-level prosecutions for friendly fire incidents, as well. This Part
further argues that incorporation of the LOAC duty of care into prosecutions
at the national level is broadly consistent with the transnational norm diffusion
process identified by the New Haven School of International Law. This Note
concludes by emphasizing a basic principle of human civilization: with great
power comes great responsibility.
II. ARCHITECTURAL OVERVIEW: LOAC
Reference to the "law of war" and "war crimes" generally brings to
mind what I believe it helpful to think of as LOAC's proscriptive core of
10. The emerging literature on technology andjus in bellum will be referenced throughout this
Note. For an example of an initial effort to come to terms with technology and jus ad bellum, see W.
Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
82 (2003) (arguing, inter alia, that modem WMDs require the law of international armed conflict to
come to terms with preemption).
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banned intentional uses of force. Building on the 1907 Fourth Hague
Convention's foundational stipulation that the "right of belligerents to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited,' ' 1 a variety of means and
methods of war among combatants have been banned.' 2 Additionally, a body
of law built on the Geneva Conventions prohibits-and customary
international law and the statutes of the international criminal tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda' 3 and the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court' 4 criminalize--deliberately subjecting the helpless to violence:
troops hors d'combat due to wounds, 15 shipwreck,' or capture; 17
noncombatants; 18 and noncombatant property not used for military purposes
by the enemy, from homes to hospitals to cultural sites.19 The LOAC regime
also designates some uses of force as "grave breaches" of the law of war, such
as torture, 20 biological experiments, taking hostages, 2' and genocide. 22 The
post-World War II prosecutions of those responsible for the war crimes of
Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan stand collectively for the Nuremberg
principle: 23 Individuals are responsible for war crimes, even if they were "just
following orders" or if they merely ordered others to do illegal things.
11. Convention [No. IV] Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with annex of
regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm [hereinafter Hague IV].
12. These include, inter alia, using chemical weapons. See Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,
opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45.
13. The Secretary-General, Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993), reprinted in 32
I.L.M. 1159 (1993) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; S.C. Res. 955,
Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1955), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (establishing the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), available at http://www.un.org/ictr/statute.html [hereinafter ICTR
Statute].
14. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter ICC Statute].
15. Geneva Convention [I] for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
16. Geneva Convention [II] for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.
17. Geneva Convention [II] Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III].
18. Geneva Convention [IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
19. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May
14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240; First Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358. These agreements were affirmed in Article 53 of
Geneva Protocol I and Article 16 of Geneva Protocol I. See Protocol t Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts art. 53, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol 1]; Protocol 11 Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts art. 16, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol 11].
20. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Ill, supra note 17, art. 3(l)(a).
21. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 18, art. 147; Geneva Protocol 1, supra note 19,
arts. 11(4), 85.
22. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
102 Stat. 2045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Note that genocide, as a crime against humanity, is not restricted to
war. Id. art. 1.
23. ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 176 (3d ed.
2000).
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Yet LOAC's reach is broader. Beyond this core of proscribed intentional
uses of force lies a prescriptive zone in which LOAC is binding and limits the
use of force against legitimate military targets where harm to protected
persons and property is unintended but possible. Here, LOAC governs
operations via the four core principles 24 of military necessity (use force only
where necessary and legal), discrimination (target military objectives, not
26protected persons and property), proportionality (prevent noncombatant
harm that is excessive in relation to the military benefit), 27 and humanity
(avoid unnecessary suffering). 28 Unfortunately, precise understandings of
what these principles mean for forces operating in good faith can be elusive.
29
Against the backdrop of such uncertainty, I argue that the application of
these four principles beyond proscribed intentional illegal uses of force can be
understood in terms of LOAC imposing a duty of care on combatants, one that
prohibits the negligent infliction of unintentional harm. In the prescriptive
zone, the legal regime's mandate is more than a simple list of dos and don'ts.
Instead, combatants owe a duty to those protected by the laws of war-those
on the receiving end of fire-analogous, at the least, to the duty individuals in
municipal society owe to one another outside the intentional harm
proscriptions of the criminal code: to take reasonable precautions under the
circumstances not to cause unintentional harm.
The existing academic literature does not organize LOAC into
proscriptive and prescriptive zones. Nor does it generally recognize the duty
of care I identify underjus in bellum. 30 This Note is therefore an initial effort
to bring the literature up to date with practice and suggest new areas for
inquiry. As the next Part explains, a duty of care is evident in a line of
command responsibility cases running from the post-World War II war crimes
tribunals through the ad hoc international criminal tribunals of the present day.
Part IV will discuss the treaty and practice bases of this duty.
24. These principles also apply in the proscriptive zone, which bans their intentional violation.
25. "Military necessity... consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable
for securing the ends of war, and which are lawful according to the modem law and usages of war."
Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, U.S. War
Dep't General Orders No. 100 art. 14 (Apr. 24, 1863), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/lieber.htm.
26. "[T]he Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population
and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives." Geneva Protocol I, supra note 19, art. 48.
27. "An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated" is not proportional. Geneva Protocol I, supra
note 19, art. 51(5)(b).
28. Combatants may not "employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering." Hague IV, supra note 11, art. 23(e).
29. Regarding proportionality, for example: "How does one measure [it]? When weighed
against military advantage, how much civilian loss of life or injury is proportional?" Francisco Forrest
Martin, Using International Human Rights Law for Establishing a Unified Use of Force Rule in the Law
ofArmed Conflict, 64 SASK. L. REv. 347, 359 (2001).
30. Although some have come close, see, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The
U.S. View of Twenty-First Century War and Its Possible Implications for the Law ofArmed Conflict, 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1051, 1081 (1998) (evaluating collateral damage incidents "will turn on exercise of
'due care' in analyzing the target and selecting the weapon and tactic to use"). As discussed in Part V,
however, scholars have argued that under jus post bellum occupying states bear a duty of care to the
citizens of the countries they govern.
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III. DUTY OF CARE: JURISPRUDENTIAL BASIS
In a series of cases, the post-World War II and current tribunals handed
down convictions of commanders for, inter alia, what amounts to criminal
negligence in the supervision of subordinates. In so doing, these courts
implicitly recognized within LOAC a duty of care that extends even to those
who claim not to have intended to cause intentional harm to civilians.3' This
endures despite the recent effort of the ICTR and ICTY to move command
responsibility into LOAC's proscriptive zone.
The term "negligence" is not found in the treaty law that preceded
World War I1.32 Nor is it explicit in the Nuremberg or Far East international
military tribunal statutes, 33 nor in the orders that established post-World War
II U.S. military commissions (nor even in the much later statutes that
established the ICTY or ICTR).34 Rather, the notion that soldiers could be
criminally negligent was first clearly recognized at the international level by
the post-World War II war crimes courts in decisions in which German and
Japanese commanders were found liable for atrocities committed by their
subordinates, over their protestations of ignorance about specific acts. These
verdicts were informed legally by the notion of criminal negligence in state
law, the statutes and regulations establishing the tribunals, a number of
generally worded provisions in the 1907 Hague and 1929 Geneva
Conventions regarding the binding nature of LOAC on commanders, and
customary international law on command responsibility that was still very
much emerging. 35 Rather than applying settled law, "[i]t was during the war
crimes trials themselves that the doctrine of command responsibility
developed" and along with it criminal negligence in international law.36
The most controversial and precedential prosecution was of General
Tomoyuki Yamashita, commander of Japanese forces in the Philippines.
Yamashita was tried by a U.S. military commission and sentenced to death for
large-scale atrocities against Philippine noncombatants and Allied POWs
carried out by his subordinates.37 The 1945 regulation under which the general
was tried stated that "leaders ... participating in the formulation or execution
31. Although breach of a duty of care is most often discussed in relation to civil suits for
negligence under the domestic law of tort and agency, criminal negligence by definition requires
existence and breach of a duty of care as well.
32. See Hague IV, supra note 11; Convention between the United States of America and
Other Powers, Relating to Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343.
33. See, e.g., Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
34. See ICTY Statute, supra note 13; ICTR Statute, supra note 13.
35. "Up until the post-World War II war crimes trials, the doctrine of command responsibility
in international law was limited to the brief pronouncements in treaty law relating to the requirement
that responsible commanders lead lawful belligerents," Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and
Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 174
(2000), specifically Article 3 of the Hague Convention of 1907 and Article 26 of the 1929 Geneva
Convention, see id. at 184. The doctrine at the international level was based primarily on customary
international law. The first known command responsibility trial in the West was that of Peter of
Hagenbach in 1474. See William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1,
4(1973).
36. Smidt, supra note 35, at 176.
37. This commission, it should be noted, was composed of generals without legal
backgrounds. Id. at 177.
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of any . . . common plan or conspiracy will be held responsible for all acts
performed by any person in execution of that plan or conspiracy," but
Yamashita claimed no knowledge of the atrocities and his defense protested
that he faced execution under an ex post facto law.38 Regardless, the military
commission concluded that "where murder and rape and vicious, revengeful
actions are widespread offenses, and there is no effective attempt by a
commander to discover and control the criminal acts, such a commander may
be held responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawless acts of his
troops. 3 9
While Yamashita has come to be widely understood to stand for a "knew
or should have known" standard, 40 a minority view holds that the commission
found the general strictly liable for war crimes under his command. 41 Michal
Stryszak takes a third position, arguing that in practice the commission
employed an actual knowledge or "must have known" standard. That is,
Stryszak contends that Yamashita was convicted not because knowledge of
which he was ignorant was imputed to him, but because the commission
"simply believed that Yamashita knew the facts."42
Stryszak argues that decisions in the post-World War II prosecutions
that followed Yamashita further muddied matters by providing indirect
support for a "should have known" standard while often ruling in actuality on
the basis of a narrower "must have known" standard.43 Regardless, the more
general proposition of criminal negligence in LOAC was affirmed. Key cases
include Toyoda ("[I]f this accused knew, or should by the exercise of ordinary
diligence have learned, of the commission by his subordinates . . . of the
atrocities ... and, by his failure to take any action to punish the perpetrators,
permitted the atrocities to continue, he has failed in his performance of his
38. Id. at 175, 179, 176 n.87.
39. United States v. Yamashita, Military Commission Appointed by Paragraph 24, Special
Orders 110 (Oct. 1, 1945), quoted in Smidt, supra note 35, at 180 (emphasis added).
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the authority of the commission to try Yamashita. See In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). The Court responded to the defense's argument that the doctrine of
command responsibility is tantamount to an ex post facto law by reasoning that unrestrained troops
would "almost certainly" violate the law of war and defeat its purpose of protecting noncombatants and
prisoners, and therefore even the general language of the Hague and 1929 Geneva Conventions imposed
"an affirmative duty" on Yamashita "to take such measures as were within his power and appropriate in
the circumstances" to ensure his subordinates complied with the law of war. Id. at 15-17. In other words,
harm to civilians in violation of LOAC by subordinates is foreseeable and commanders are in breach of
their duty to adhere to LOAC as commanders unless they take reasonable precautions within their
capacity under the circumstances to prevent it. Justices Murphy and Rutledge filed eloquent dissents.
40. See, e.g., Smidt, supra note 35, at 181, 184.
41. This view was held by Yamashita's defense counsel and Telford Taylor, chief U.S.
prosecutor at Nuremberg, and has some support in the legal academic literature. See Michal Stryszak,
Command Responsibility: How Much Should a Commander be Expected to Know?, 11 U.S. AIR FORCE
ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 43, 73 n.93 (2002).
42. Id. at 43. Stryszyak traces the development of a knowledge requirement in command
responsibility and argues that "a pure 'should have known' standard" should be adopted, reflecting "the
proper balance between humanitarian objectives and the practical limitations a commander faces." Id. at
28.
43. Id. at 44-57. Stryszak argues that the High Command and Hostage Cases, like Yamashita,
generally have been read as consistent with the "knew or should have known" standard, but in reality
German commanders were convicted under a "must have known" standard-the commissions did not
believe they were ignorant. See generally id.
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duty."),44 Pohl (a defendant commander's "assertions that he did not know
what was happening in the labor camps and enteTrises under his jurisdiction
does not exonerate him. It was his duty to know"), and Roechling ("[It] is his
duty to know what occurs in his organization, and lack of knowledge,
therefore, can only be the result of criminal negligence.").46 Of particular note
is the High Command case, in which something akin to strict liability was
rejected in favor of fault or negligence liability (although of a culpable
negligence or recklessness variety):
Criminality does not attach to every individual in this chain of command .... There must
be a personal dereliction. That can occur only where the act is directly traceable to him or
where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates constitutes criminal negligence
on his part. In the latter case it must be a personal neglect amounting to a wanton,
immoral disregard of the action of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence.47
With a foundation in the form of these post-World War II cases, Articles
86 and 87 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (adopted in
1977), 48 Article 7 of the ICTY Statute, and Article 6 of the ICTR Statute, the
international war crimes tribunals currently in operation have also embraced
command responsibility and with it the notion of criminal negligence.
However, embrace of conflicting understandings of criminal negligence in
trial court opinions prompted appellate chambers to decry it in their command
responsibility cases, but not more generally negate the notion.
In Celebici I, a trial court tracked municipal law's aversion to simple
negligence as a basis for criminality. Here, "some ICTY judges were inclined
to limit imputed responsibility to those cases where a superior 'wantonly'
44. United States v. Toyoda, Judgment 4999, Official Transcript of Record of Trial, at 5006
(1949), cited in Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 316 (Mar. 3, 2000), available
at http://www.un.org/icty/Blagkid/trialcl/judgement/index.htm (emphasis added). This prosecution did
not result in a conviction. Stryszak writes that Toyoda, "while also incorporating a reasonableness
standard, slightly confused the issue by espousing both a 'must have known' and a 'should have known'
standard, which are not the same." Stryszak, supra note 41, at 56-57.
45. United States v. Pohl (1947), in 5 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 195, 1055 (1997 ed.) [hereinafter
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS] (emphasis added). The in-text quote is from the part of the Pohl verdict
concerning Karl Mummenthey, who "as an SS officer, wielded military power of command" in the
forced labor division of the SS. Id. at 1052. He therefore "could not help knowing about concentration
camp labor" and abuses, id. at 1053, and thus Mummenthey's "criminality lies in culpable indifference
to humanity," id. at 1054.
46. Military Gov't for the Fr. Zone of Occupation in Germany v. Roechling (1949), in 14
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1061 app. B at 1106 (emphasis added). In this case, German industrialists
and government officials were tried for their participation in Nazi Germany's crimes of aggression,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes, including inter alia the plundering of protected property and
enslavement and ill-treatment of noncombatants and POWs. Although the "defense of lack of
knowledge" was raised and rejected, the tribunal also found considerable evidence of direct violation of
the law of war by the defendants. See id. at 1119, 1139-1140.
47. United States v. Von Leeb (High Command Case) (1948), in 10-11 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 1 (vol. 10), 543-44 (vol. 11) (emphasis added). Distinguishing Yamashita on the facts, the
High Command judgment applies a similar but still somewhat narrower formulation than the Yamashita
"knew or should have known" standard: "[T]he occupying commander must have knowledge of these
offenses and acquiesce or participate or criminally neglect to interfere in their commission and ... the
offenses committed must be patently criminal." Id. at 544-45.
48. Although Protocol I is generally accepted as customary international law, there is some
skepticism about whether this particular provision has achieved that status. Mirjan Damalka, The
Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 486 n.60 (2001).
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disregarded specific information available to him of a character that should
have alerted him to the impending criminal activity of his troops." '9
However, in Blas/dc I, another ICTY trial court hewed closer to the
criminalization of simple negligence in some circumstances in national
military codes, opining that a commander could be criminally liable for
simply knowing he was obligated, but failing to establish, procedures that
would have let him know of subordinate war crimes.50 In Bagilishema I, in
contrast, an ICTR trial court wrote that "ordinary principles of the law of
negligence apply to ascertain whether an accused person was in breach of a
duty of care towards his or her victim," yet at other points gave mixed signals
about what variety of negligence standard applied.5'
Certainly, "to call someone a 'negligent war criminal' sounds strange to
lay ears." 52 Confusion about negligence standards only made matters worse.
In response, the ICTR Appeals Chamber held in Bagilishema II that criminal
negligence "has not been clearly defined in international criminal law," is
"likely to lead to confusion of thought" regarding command responsibility,
and therefore "[i]t is better . that Trial Chambers do not describe superior
responsibility in terms of negligence at all."53 Bagilishema II also embraced
the ICTY appellate court's clarification in Celebici II of the "had reason to
know" knowledge standard in the Tribunal statutes: command responsibility
pertains "only if information was available to him which would have put him
on notice of offences committed by subordinates" '54 and the commander failed
to take "necessary and reasonable" remedial steps. Bagilishema II was
endorsed by the ICTY appellate body in Blaskic II
5 '
Within the last Part's framework, these appellate decisions can be
understood as an effort to move command responsibility into or closer to
LOAC's proscriptive zone. If the commander is "on notice" of potential
subordinate crimes, failing to prevent or punish looks less inadvertent and
more analogous to a soldier being suspicious that a magazine contains illegal
exploding bullets but using it anyway.
However, the appellate decisions could not entirely dispose of
negligence notions. Both tribunal statutes were written with Yamashita and
criminal negligence prosecutions in mind 56 and, again, require commanders to
take "necessary and reasonable measures" to prevent and punish. 57
49. Id. at 465, 463 n. 18; Prosecutor v. Mucic (Celebici 1), Case No. IT-96-2 1 -T, Judgment,
393 (Nov. 16, 1998).
50. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic (Blaskic I), Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 77 560-62, 726-31
(Mar. 3, 2000).
51. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema (Bagilishema 1), Case No. ICTR 95-1 A-T, Judgment, 1010,
1011-12, 1021, 46 (June 7, 2001).
52. Damagka, supra note 48, at 466.
53. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema (Bagilishema II), Case No. ICTR 95-IA-A, Judgment
(Reasons), 34-36 (July 3, 2002).
54. Id. at 7 33; Prosecutor v. Mucic (Celebici II), Case No. IT-96-2 1-A, Judgment, 1241 (Feb.
20, 2001).
55. Prosecutor v. Blaskic (Blaskic II), Case No. IT-95-14-A, 63 (July 29, 2004).
56. Smidt, supra note 35, at 200, 206.
57. ICTY Statute, supra note 13, art. 7(3); ICTR Statute, supra note 13, art. 6(3) (emphasis
added).
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Subsequent academic analyses 58 suggest that a gross negligence or
recklessness standard now operates and that simple negligence was rejected,
of the kind found in the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)."
Ultimately, these opinions only proscribed negligence analysis in
command responsibility cases. They did not overturn the post-World War II
cases, much less eliminate criminal negligence generally from LOAC. The
genie is out of the bottle. Enduring is the idea that combatants in LOAC's
prescriptive zone generally have a duty of care in adhering to the laws of war,
and that a negligence standard--of some kind-is appropriate where intent to
violate LOAC cannot be established.
Setting the command responsibility context aside for the moment,
combatants also directly bear an obligation not to be criminally negligent in
their own acts. As the next Part explains, in the years between the war crimes
tribunals of the mid-1940s and those of the 1990s and 2000s, LOAC evolved
in precisely this way through treaty law and state practice.
IV. THE DUTY OF CARE: TREATY AND PRACTICE BASES
On March 26, 2007, retired General Barry R. McCaffrey filed a report
with his West Point colleagues on his recent visit to Iraq. In an assessment
alternately gloomy and inspiring, the general recounted watching
with fascination the attack video of an Apache [helicopter] whose pilots held fire at
absolutely the last second-when what they suspected (correctly) was an innocent farmer
appeared in the foreground of a pending Hellfire [missile] launch against 5-6 armed
insurgents. The pilot painstakingly changed his attack angle-and sailed the Hellfire over
the farmer's head and successfully nailed the insurgents.
6
Captured in digital form, the general was witnessing a pilot adhering to LOAC
even though he had no intent to violate it, and even though he-personally
engaged in combat-could not have been prosecuted under a command
responsibility theory.
58. See, e.g., Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 159, 179 (2007) ("any form of negligence, including an unconscious one will suffice,
contrary to the interpretation" in Bagilishema H and Blaskic I); David L. Nersessian, Whoops, I
Committed Genocide! The Anomaly of Constructive Liability for Serious International Crimes, 30
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 81, 95 (2006) (knowledge and "the reasonableness of [a commander's]
response already are governed by principles of gross negligence"); Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S.
Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the
Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REv. 75, 129 (2005) ("something greater than
ordinary negligence is required to trigger liability").
59. See, e.g., Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 134 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 934) (2004)
[hereinafter UCMJ]. Article 134 is a General Article allowing criminal prosecution for "all disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital" not otherwise criminalized.
This includes negligent homicide. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, at IV-1 11,
para. 85(c)(2) (2005 ed.) (citing Article 134's definition of "simple negligence"), available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/mcm.pdf [hereinafter MCM]. "There is a special need in the
military to make the killing of another as a result of simple negligence a criminal act," stemming from
the military's highly lethal capabilities. United States v. Kick, 7 M.J. 82, 84 (1979).
60. Memorandum from Barry R. McCaffrey to Col. Michael Meese, West Point Professor,
Regarding Visit to Iraq and Kuwait March 9-16, 2007, at 6 (Mar. 26, 2007), available at
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/McCaffrey-Report-032707.pdf.
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The Apache sortie reminds us that the law of war is not limited in its
sweep to its proscriptive core. LOAC does not merely forbid the murder of
civilians ordered by Hitler, Milosevic, and their minions, but covers the field,
also embracing negligence, although of an indefinite variety. It binds
combatants who in good faith seek only to neutralize legitimate military
targets but in the process endanger protected persons and property.
The definitions of negligence under U.S. military law are a helpful
departure point. Simple negligence is defined as "the absence of due care, that
is, an act or omission of a person who is under a duty to use due care which
exhibits a lack of that degree of care of the safety of others which a reasonably
careful person would have exercised under the same or similar
circumstances." 61 "Culpable negligence" in the case of involuntary
manslaughter is defined as "a degree of carelessness greater than simple
negligence. . . . a negligent act or omission accompanied by a culpable
disregard for the foreseeable consequences to others of that act or omission...
• When there is no legal duty to act there can be no neglect." 62 Each of these
elements of negligence in U.S. military law-a duty of care owed to victims
of violence in war that requires reasonable steps in light of what is foreseeable
under the circumstances-can be discerned in the key principles of LOAC as
expressed in post-World War II treaties and state practice.
A. The Four Principles: Treaty and Customary Law
Although cognizable in the holdings of the World War II adjudications
and the Geneva Conventions that followed-all of which make frequent
allusions to "duty"--the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions provides the clearest treaty basis for finding a duty of care
inherent in application of the four principles. 63 Article 57 is particularly
significant for our purposes. Instead of using the prohibitory language of the
Geneva Conventions regarding targeting civilians and mistreating prisoners, it
calls for "Precautions in Attack," steps which amount to taking the greatest
care a combatant can reasonably take under circumstances where
noncombatant harm is not intended but is a real risk. In planning and
executing attacks, combatants must:
(i) Do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are
neither civilians nor civilian objects... ;
(ii) Take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of
attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing,
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to
civilian objects;
61. MCM, supra note 50, at IV- 11, para 85(c)(2).
62. Id. at IV-65, para. 44(c)(2)(a)(i)-(ii).
63. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (listing the treaty-based definitions of the
four principles themselves).
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(iii) Refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life ... excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated .... 64
Couched in terms of what is feasible and foreseeable for combatants in the
circumstances of combat, these precautions embody the principles of
discrimination, humanity, and proportionality, and do so in terms familiar to
scholars and practitioners of negligence law. Article 57(4) of Geneva Protocol
I requires combatants to "take all reasonable precautions" to avoid harming
noncombatants. 65 Most nations have ratified Geneva Protocol I, and the
United States-which has signed but not ratified-regards most provisions of
the Protocol as customary international law.66
B. The Four Principles: Practice
That a duty of care has become, in essence, a customary principle of
international law is evident from a brief survey of the practice of nations. The
United States military has given specific force to Article 57 by quoting it
verbatim in, inter alia, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law-The
Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations. In this manual, the U.S. Air
Force also expresses military necessity in the following terms: "the principle
which justifies measures of regulated force not forbidden by international law
which are indispensable for securing the prompt submission of the enemy,
with the least possible expenditures of economic and human resources."
67
That is, even outside of acts expressly proscribed by the law of war, care must
still be taken to regulate force. Similarly, the Commander's Handbook of
Naval Operations issued by the U.S. Navy expresses the principles of
necessity, discrimination, and proportionality thus:
" The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited.
* It is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such.
" Distinctions must be made between combatants and noncombatants, to
the effect that noncombatants be spared as much as possible.68
Note that this is not a legal duty to inflict no harm. Reflecting a similar
understanding, the Chief of the Royal Australian Air Force instructs
commanders that "constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population
and civilian objects to the maximum extent possible." 69 As the United
64. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 19, art. 57(2)(a).
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. MATTHEW C. WAXMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF URBAN AIR
OPERATIONS 8 n. 14 (2000).
67. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW -THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT
AND AIR OPERATIONS, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, at 1-5, 1-6 (1976) (emphasis added).
68. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
8.1 (1995), quoted in WAXMAN, supra note 66, at 8 n.12 (emphasis added). The first bullet quotes
verbatim Article 22 of Hague IV. See Hague IV, supra note 15.
69. RAAF, supra note 7, at 4 (emphasis added).
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Kingdom's Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict states, "civilian immunity
does not make unlawful the unavoidable incidental civilian casualties and
damage which may result from legitimate attacks upon military objectives,"
provided that the former are warranted by the latter.
70
Identifying protected persons and property, estimating and minimizing
potential unintended harm, and weighing that risk against the military
objective are often discussed in terms recognizable to lawyers as those of
negligence law. As Matthew Waxman's RAND Project Air Force study noted,
"[firom a planning standpoint, the[] principles [of discrimination and
proportionality] contain a foreseeability element: planners must consider
collateral damage and likely injury to noncombatants or civilian property and
must take reasonable actions to avoid or minimize these potential effects."
71
A report for the Canadian government on technology and the laws of war puts
it plainly: "[f]rom the principle of distinction flows a duty of care ...
everything feasible must be done to verify that the objective to be attacked is
neither civilians nor a civilian object but is in fact a legitimate milita 7
objective. This is an obligation of means and not an obligation of results. '
Similarly, in response to reports of involvement of U.N. peacekeeping forces
in prostitution rings and abuse of civilians, the United Nations issued a
"Peacekeeper's Duty of Care" stating that it is "the duty of each peacekeeper
to protect the vulnerable . . . "73 The Army National Guard of the state of
Maine-which like every other U.S. state has deployed troops during the War
on Terror-instructs its soldiers to "[t]ake all reasonable steps to shield
civilians [and other protected categories] from unnecessary harm. 74
The United Kingdom makes clear that LOAC's duty of care extends to
all involved in military operations, and similarly couches it in the terminology
of negligence. The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict stipulates that those
who "merely carry out orders for an attack also have a responsibility: to
cancel or suspend the attack" if it appears to them that "the proportionality
rule would be breached.",75 One is "normally only guilty of a war crime if he
commits it with intent and knowledge," 76 yet "a failure to take reasonable
steps to verify information [regarding an attack] might give rise to criminal
responsibility." 77 In such a circumstance of criminal negligence, "the
responsibility of the officer ... would be assessed in the light of the facts as
70. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 2.4.2 (2004).
71. WAXMAN, supra note 66, at 18 (emphasis added).
72. Michel Bourbonniere, LOAC and the Neutralization of Satellites, oR IUS in Bellum
Satellitis (Int'l Sec. Res. & Outreach Programme, Int'l Sec. Bureau, Dep't of For. Aff. & Int'l Trade,
Gov't of Canada, May 2003), available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/arms/isrop/research/bourbonniere_2003/
ius in bellumsatellitisbourbonniere.pdf (emphasis added).
73. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info, Peace and Security, Challenges in Peace Operations: DPKO
Stresses Conduct and a Duty of Care, at 22, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/year-review05/
PDFs/challenges.pdf (last visited April 27, 2007).
74. Maine Army National Guard, Law of War (PowerPoint presentation), at 11, available at
www.me.ngb.army.mil/IG/training/Military/20Juctice/Law of War.ppt (last visited April 27, 2007)
(emphasis added).
75. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., supra note 70, 5.32.9.
76. Id. 16.39.
77. Id. 16.45.2 (emphasis added).
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he believed them to be, on the information reasonably available to him from
all sources. 78
V. THE REASONABLE COMBATANT: PRECISION BUT NOT PERFECTION
A. The Reasonable Combatant
79
As in the case of the negligence-based duty of care operative in LOAC's
prescriptive zone, what we can term the municipal "law of responsibility"-
tort and agency-focuses on the obligations of actors to those they harm
unintentionally. With the exception of strict liability and intentional torts, this
obligation, under tort law, generally takes the form of a duty not to harm
another negligently by failing to exercise the care one would expect from a
reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances. 80 Well established
defenses to tort liability, which are also operative in the municipal criminal
negligence context, are perfect analogues to the fundamental reasons why it is
not illegal to kill in war and why war, writ large, can be legal: necessity, self-
defense, defense of others, and defense of property. Under the law of
agency, an agent owes duties of care and loyalty to a principal to make,82
reasonable decisions in the principal's interest. Principals, for their part, are
responsible to third parties for the actions of their agents (usually contracts
and torts) when those agents are acting within the scope of their
employment.
83
We can therefore conceive of a "reasonable combatant," as one who has
obligations to third parties-that is, unintended recipients of fire-for
accidental harm inflicted directly and by agents. This reasonable combatant is
protected by a general presumption of employing violence in good faith for
reasons of military necessity. This combatant is likewise expected to exercise
the care regarding foreseeable risks that a soldier of that individual's rank,
training, and knowledge would under similar combat circumstances.
An additional principle common to both tort and agency law is central to
this Part's analysis: As one executes one's duty of care, one's responsibility
for harmful effects generally varies with one's capacity to exercise control.
Generally, the greater a principal's control over an agent, the greater the
principal's responsibility for the effects of an agent's actions on third parties8 4
In the business world, principals are commonly employers, agents are hires,
third parties can be customers or bystanders, and principals are sued for
contract breaches and torts resulting from agent-third party interactions.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Smidt writes of a "reasonable commander" in discussing Article 86(2) of Geneva Protocol
I, but I use the broader term combatant to embrace subordinates also bound by LOAC's duty of care. See
Smidt, supra note 35, at 202.
80. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 129-50 (5th ed. 1990).
81. For a discussion of tort law on the subject, see id. at 28-60.
82. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY, §§ 379, 387 (1957).
83. This agency responsibility idea has resonance in Geneva Protocol I: "A Party to the
conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands,
be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of
its armed forces." Geneva Protocol I, supra note 19, art. 91.
84. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY, supra note 82, § 219.
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Analogized to war, principals are our reasonable combatants, agents are their
means of attack (from programmable PGMs to subordinate soldiers-who in
turn bear a duty of care), and third parties are the unhappy recipients of attack.
Alternatively, depending on the situation, nations are principals and
combatants are agents.85 Logically, then, greater ability to control the means
of attack-which RMA systems offer--dictates a narrower margin before
accidental harm to noncombatants begins to shade into negligence.
The prima facie tort case involves an act that is voluntary or the
omission of one that is expected. Generally, the less voluntary one's actions
(or inactions in some situations), the less one's liability, and vice versa.
Capacity reasons underscore why very young children are not held liable, and
why in the case of a common carrier or a professional, avoiding negligence
generally means inflicting fewer harms than in the baseline case of a
reasonably prudent non-professional under similar circumstances. Analogized
to war, the more a reasonable combatant can control a legal use of force, the
more he or she is responsible for unintended harms. This Note focuses on
unintended harm to noncombatants and their property, but accidentally killing
86 8one's fellow troops, or those of a multinational coalition partner,87 could
equally raise questions about a combatant's negligent performance of their
duty of care, perhaps in connection with charges of manslaughter stemming
from the use of RMA systems.
As Section V.B infra explains, the advanced systems of the RMA offer
unprecedented capacity to control the effects of weapons. Accordingly, those
who voice concern about noncombatant casualties inflicted by America's
high-technology military are, in principle, correct that this technology can
bring heightened responsibility. As a general theoretical proposition, it would
be negligent (at the least) for a military with greater ability to control violence
in war to practice discrimination and proportionality no better than one with
crude, unguided weapons, all else being equal.
Although tort law generally accords strict liability for harms caused by
explosives and other ultra-hazardous materials, it would be wrong to decide
that PGMs and other RMA systems now make it feasible to attach strict
85. A "military commander ... is subject both to the orders of his military superiors and the
state itself ... He is their agent and instrument for certain purposes in a position from which they can
remove him at will." United States v. Von Leeb (High Command Case) (1948), in 10-11 TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS 1 (vol. 10), 543 (vol. 11) (emphasis added).
86. Criminal negligence is often at issue in friendly-fire incidents, such as the death of former
professional football player and Army Ranger Pat Tillman. See Ann Scott Tyler, 9 Officers Blamed in
Tillman Death, but No Coverup Found, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2007, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/26/AR200703260073 Ipf.html.
87. A British coroner recently alleged criminal conduct by U.S. Air Force pilots in a March
28, 2003 friendly fire incident in Iraq, in which a British soldier was killed and four others injured. See
Thomas Wagner, Brits Rule Friendly Fire Deaths Criminal, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 16, 2007,
available at http://abcnews.go.conlntemational/wireStory?id=295662 1.
RTGAM.20070316.wfriendlyfireO3l6/EmailBNStory/Intemational/home. The coroner does not
frame the allegation in terms of violation of a duty of care under LOAC, and he claims there is "no
evidence the pilots were acting in self-defense." Id. Assuming that the pilots did not target the British
troops, this incident involves alleged criminality stemming from accidental harm to persons legally
immune from direct attack. RMA technologies were all but certainly involved; media reports indicate
that the pilots relied on datalinks with a forward controller on the ground and took video imagery. See
id.
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liability in the LOAC context to accidental harms caused by high explosives.
As explained in Section V.C, due to the nature of war, the RMA itself, and
adversary adaptation, the technologies of Transformation cannot transform the
negligence-based duty of care into a duty of perfection. Unintended harm to
protected persons and property in war is inevitable, and anything akin to a
strict negligence standard would be unrealistic. In response to persistent
uncertainty in LOAC about exactly what kind of negligence standard should
pertain, and in view of LOAC's protection of individuals, in Section V.D I
suggest drawing on another municipal law notion-fiduciary duty-to inform
LOAC's duty of care.
B. "Effects-Based Targeting" and Responsibility for Effects
Although the facts when evaluating RMA systems involve strike and
reconnaissance technology rather than an individual's position on a military
organizational chart and the paperwork they receive, the principles are the
same as those animating the command responsibility cases: control,
knowledge, and responsibility for effects. As the ICTR wrote in Bagilishema
I, "the essential element is not whether a superior had authority over a certain
geographical area, but whether he or she had effective control over the
individuals who committed the crimes, and whether he or she knew or had
reason to know that the subordinates were committing or had committed a
crime under the Statutes." 88 These factors determined whether the harms that
subordinates had caused would be attributed to the superior's negligence.
Control and knowledge are likewise at the core of the RMA, which-all else
being equal-can narrow the limits of acceptable effects.
The RMA is driven by synergetic advances that improve capacity to see,
talk, and strike. 89 Advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) systems hold out the possibility of providing commanders "dominant
battlespace awareness"9 : "the ability to see a 'battlefield' as large as Iraq or
Korea-an area 200 miles on a side-with unprecedented fidelity,
comprehension, and timeliness; by night or day, in any kind of weather, all the
time." 91 The second element is known in military shorthand as C41: command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence. Through broadband
datalinks and real-time virtual conferencing, increasing numbers of
participants in military operations have a commonly accessible sense of the
battlespace. Third, these targets can then be struck with remarkably precice
weapons.92 The air "warfighter's weapon of choice," used more than 15,000
88. Bagilishema I, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, Judgment, 45 (June 7, 2001).
89. For a description of the RMA in terms of information, weapon, and space systems and
increasing military dependence on civilians and their infrastructure, see Schmitt, supra note 30, at 1059-
69.
90. JOINT VISION 2010, supra note 9, at 13.
91. OWENS, LIFTING THE FOG OF WAR, supra note 8, at 14.
92. See id. at 15-16.
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times since its introduction during the Kosovo air war,93 has been the Joint
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), accurate to less than ten meters.94
Together, the RMA's "system of systems" has allowed "effects-based
targeting," under which commanders choose and attack targets to produce
certain results rather than the target's destruction.95 For example, an enemy's
(dis)information ministry might be effectively neutralized with a precision
strike on its transmitter, rather than destruction of the facility. As one would
expect, "[tihe enhanced precision of air power . . . has strengthened
international obligations to discriminate among targets. The legal regime's
demands for civilian-military target distinction have further hardened as
greater precision spurred the replacement of strategic theories emphasizing
massive area bombardment with those emphasizing more economical uses of
firepower.' '96 Expressed in terms of the duty of care, it would be negligent to
inflict the same harms even though one's capacity for control has improved,
assuming all else is equal.
A useful example is one of the areas of revolutionary advance in military
technology most often cited by champions of the RMA: strategic air power. In
World War II it could take hundreds of bombers and thousands of unguided
bombs to attack a single target successfully (with the vast majority of bombs
missing the target), while today, a single B-2 bomber with sixteen JDAMs can
destroy sixteen targets nearly all the time. Today, use of conventional
weapons 97 to inflict anything approaching the level of harm frequently
93. Ryan Hansen, JDAM Continues to Be Warfighter's Weapon of Choice, AIR FORCE LINK,
Mar. 17, 2006, http://www.af mil/news/story.asp?storylD= 123017613.
94. See U.S. Air Force, Fact Sheet: Joint Direct Attack Munitions GBU 31/32/38, AIR FORCE
LINK, Jan. 2006, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=108.
95. A seminal work by an architect of the 1991 Gulf War air campaign is DAVID A. DEPTULA,
FIRING FOR EFFECT: CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF WARFARE (1995). For a later account that builds on
Deptula's concepts and applies them to joint operations, see Edward Mann, Gary Endersby & Tom
Searle, Dominant Effects: Effects-Based Joint Operations, AEROSPACE POWER J., Fall 200 1, at 92.
96. WAXMAN, supra note 66, at 11-12.
97. Any use of nuclear weapons would carry considerable risk of noncombatant harm due to
the difficulty of confining radiation and other effects to military targets. Under the principle of
proportionality, however, such unintended yet foreseeable harm would be balanced against military
necessity. Although the significant risk of such harm would set the necessity bar high, it is far from
theoretically insurmountable. Indeed, the United States developed and fielded (and against Japan in
1945 used) nuclear weapons for the stated reason that their use could be justified on national security
grounds. Analysts can reasonably ask whether this stated reason still drives policy for states that possess
or desire nuclear weapons, see, e.g., THE NUCLEAR TIPPING POINT: WHY STATES RECONSIDER THEIR
NUCLEAR CHOICES (Kurt M. Campbell et al. eds., 2004); Dakota S. Rudesill, India's Nuclear Capability:
Explanations, Implications, and Outlook, Presentation at Project on Nuclear Issues Summer Conference,
U.K. Ministry of Defence (June 16, 2005), but such states inevitably offer a military necessity rationale
that suggests that use is more than a theoretical possibility.
Duty of care analysis might be quite relevant to limited nuclear use-for example, employment
of a single warhead against a rogue state facility thought to contain weapons of mass destruction on the
verge of launch. Collateral damage could lead to accusations of war crimes, prompting inquiry into the
decisionmaking of the commanders focusing on what steps they took to inform themselves of the threat
and the non-combatant risk, how seriously they weighed those considerations, whether they evaluated
alternative means of neutralizing the threat (could multiple conventional "bunker-buster" PGMs have
done the trick?), and ultimately what they knew (or believed they knew) and when they knew it. In other
words, did they fulfill their duty of care or were they negligent in pulling the nuclear trigger?
This is a somewhat more definite view than taken by the International Court of Justice, which in
1996 held that there is no "conventional rule of a general scope, nor a customary rule specifically
proscribing the threat or use of nuclear weapons per se" and could not conclude whether threat or use
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suffered by noncombatants in World War II would likely be characterized by
many in the international community as a war crime.
This is a useful but obviously extreme example. The range of acceptable
noncombatant suffering has clearly narrowed thanks to the RMA, but how
much? Was one military scholar writing in the wake of Operation Allied
Force correct that America can no longer afford to miss?
98
C. A Duty of Care, Not of Perfection
After all, the RMA was explicitly sold to the Pentagon and the public
not only on the basis of its promise of enhanced military capabilities against
the enemY, but also on its promise to reduce casualties of all kinds-
friendly,9 noncombatant, and even enemy. 1° Accordingly, would it be so
unreasonable for advocates for the victims of war to hold the United States to
a legally heightened standard of care under which significant noncombatant
casualties bring a presumption of criminal negligence?
For all of the RMA's promise, it would not be appropriate to respond to
the RMA by imposing on militarily advanced nations a duty of perfection. A
sort of strict liability standard would be incompatible with the nature of war
and could have perverse consequences.
1. The Nature of War
RMA advocates endeavored to lift the fog of war--or at least mitigate
its impact' 0 1-through technological, organizational, and operational changes
that have produced remarkable results. However, the "fog and friction" of
which Carl Von Clausewitz wrote will always be a reality of war.' 02 There are
limits to how much information about the "battlespace" humans can process,
and decisionmaking will inevitably be shaped and judgment clouded by the
uncertainty, fear, and anger that has always characterized war. Soldiers are
reasonable people under the unreasonable conditions of war; a strict standard
would be legal or illegal for a state whose "very survival would be at stake." Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, at 34, 41 (July 8).
98. Phillip S. Meilinger, Precision Aerospace Power, Discrimination, and the Future of War,
AEROSPACE POWER J., Fall 2001, at 15.
99. Pre-9/l I public and military expectations about casualties were a driving factor behind the
RMA. For contemporary discussions, see, for example, WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR:
BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AND THE FUTURE OF COMBAT 419 (2001) (noting that Operation Allied Force, which
General Clark commanded as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, was characterized by "the
exclusive reliance on [hi-tech] airpower, the reluctance to accept friendly casualties, the horror of
civilian casualties on any side ... and the impact of the media"). In the late 1990s, "it wasn't just the
politicians who were pushing the military to avoid casualties. We [senior military commanders] were
feeling the impact of deeply rooted organizational forces from within the military itself' that
discouraged casualties in war. Id. at 437; see also OWENS, LIFTING THE FOG OF WAR, supra note 8, at
154-56.
100. Many military operations practitioners and scholars saw the RMA's potential already
being realized after the Kosovo war. See, e.g., Meilinger, supra note 98, at 13. As high casualties among
U.S. forces, insurgents, and civilians during U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have subsequently
demonstrated, however, ground combat has not been as "humanized" as high-technology air war.
101. "While the friction and fog of war can never be eliminated, new technology promises to
mitigate their impact." JOINT VISION 2010, supra note 9, at 16.
102. See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR (Michael Howard & Peter Paret, eds. & trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (1832).
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is asking too much. It also asks too much of technology-of any age. "Perfect
accuracy is not guaranteed-failure of the guidance system or aircraft
equipment, as well as aircrew error, means that accidents still happen .... 03
Aspects of twenty-first century warfare, in particular, militate against
anything more than a negligence-based duty of care regarding non-intentional
harms in war. Although on a net basis RMA technologies are reducing the fog
of war generally, advances in seeing, talking, and striking can be offset
significantly by other consequences of the RMA itself and by enemy
adaptation.
First, information overload is a problem in a way it never was before.
Clausewitz bemoaned seeing too little through the fog. Today, an unexpected
byproduct of seeing through the fog of war can be seeing too much. The
torrent of data before commanders can crowd out the refined actionable
intelligence that is the basis for not just reasonable decisions but right
decisions. 105
A second factor is compressed decision time. Contractors talk
approvingly of "sensor-to-shooter loops"' 0 6 reduced from hours to minutes
between the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars. Yet in the context of information
overload, this can be a curse. "Targets of opportunity" may be fleeting,
generating terrific pressure for on-the-spot decisions. A large number of the
civilian casualties caused during recent wars occurred during attacks on
moving or otherwise fleeting targets that forced the hand of commanders.' 07
A third factor stressing decisionmaking by high-technology militaries is
the heightened stakes of individual strikes. The tactical can become strategic
because the world can now be aware of the outcome of individual
engagements via satellite TV and the intemet even before the commanders
who ordered them-and such relatively minor events can have a significant
impact on the politics of military operations. This is the "CNN factor."',
0 8
Today, "every bomb, missile, or bullet fired by an American airman, soldier,
or sailor is a political act. When a bomb goes astray and hits a residential area,
when a Tomahawk missile crashes into a hotel lobby ... US foreign policy-
not just military policy-suffers a setback." 109
The locus of war is also complicating discrimination and proportionality.
Every major U.S. operation of the past two decades has involved combat in
urban areas with intermingled civilian and military populations and
103. Meilinger, supra note 98, at 13. These accidents may become even harder to reconcile
with a stricter liability standard under the laws of war as autonomous munitions-such as unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) with offensive capability-are developed and deployed. For discussion of
autonomous munitions, see MICHAEL O'HANLON, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE FUTURE OF
WARFARE 109 (2000).
104. See Schmitt, supra note 30, at 1063.
105. See Michael R. Gordon, For Smart Bombs, Smarter Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
2006, § 4 at 4.
106. See, e.g., Diane Stratmar, Eyes and Ears Above: E-JOA To Be a Key Mode in the
Integrated Battle Space, BOEING FRONTIERS, July 2004, http://www.boeing.com/news/frontiers/archive/
2004/july/iids2.html.
107. See HRW, supra note 3, at 26 (describing the Carr Ctr. for Human Rights Policy's Project
on the Means of Intervention).
108. Meilinger, supra note 98, at 15 (bracketed material omitted).
109. Id.
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property-a trend that will become a rule as more infrastructure becomes
dual-use. °10 Consequently, "[w]hen American aircraft struck Serbian targets in
Bosnia in 1995 and Serbia/Kosovo in 1999, they used PGMs almost
exclusively in populated areas," 111 a practice generally continued in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Transportation arteries have been another loci of war
featuring both military and nonmilitary targets. Not surprisingly, "[d]uring the
air war in Yugoslavia, Human Rights Watch found that five of the ten worst
incidents involving civilian deaths were air attacks on presumed Yugoslav
military convoys or transportation routes that turned out to include large
numbers of civilians."" 
2
Most frustratingly, however, our adversaries know about all of the above
and are "asymmetrically" trying to neutralize U.S. technological advances by
violating the law of war-by intermingling their combatants with civilians in
urban areas, hoping that a U.S. strike will kill innocents before the eyes of the
world. Although Article 51 of Protocol I bans the use of civilians as human
shields, 13 insurgents in Iraq have repeatedly used mosques and even civilian
crowds as fighting positions and cover,1 4 giving Coalition forces the awful
choice of either refraining from attack and thereby rewarding enemy violation
of LOAC with a refuge, or attacking and harming the innocent Iraqis whose
favor they seek. In other words, technology and the risk to noncombatants are
evolving in tandem, rather than the former automatically offsetting the latter.
This is a compelling argument for not raising the bar too high.
2. Perverse Results
Another argument for not requiring perfection is the perverse results
which a strict liability standard could produce. Consider a legal double
standard reflecting what Michael Schmitt terms our age's "normative
relativism," 115 under which a strict standard is assigned to high-technology
nations, while lower-technology nations remain under a negligence standard.
The less advanced military would have greater license to inflict noncombatant
casualties during war, and, if prosecution is a real danger, would have a
perverse incentive not to acquire more precise weaponry.
110. See WAXMAN, supra note 66, at ix. The increasing reliance of the United States and other
advanced militaries on civilians and their infrastructure, and the likelihood that "cyberwar" will involve
warfare through and against dual-use information technology infrastructure used predominantly by
civilians suggests that discrimination and proportionality may only become more challenging, increasing
the possibility and extent of harm to critical civilian infrastructure and the noncombatants who depend
on it. For related discussion, see Schmitt, supra note 30, at 1075-76 (addressing discrimination
challenges); Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of
Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT'L L. J. 179, 180 (2006) (noting that "the problem
inherent in the emergence of cyberspace as a medium of warfare [is that it is] nowhere"-and
everywhere). For analysis of the question of when a cyberattack is-and should be-an attack under
LOAC, see, for example, Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A
Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L. 207 (2002).
111. Meilinger, supra note 98, at 13.
112. HRW, supra note 3, at § 6.
113. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 19, art. 51(7).
114. See, e.g., MARTHA RADDATZ, THE LONG ROAD HOME 130-32 (2007).
115. Schmitt, supra note 30, at 1088.
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Alternatively, imposing something akin to a strict standard for all would
also be unworkable and perverse. Because poorer nations may not be able to
afford advanced technology, a strict standard for all would tell most nations
that they could not defend themselves. More generally, as a practical matter,
under a strict standard war would become increasingly difficult to wage
legally, to the point that the regime would be increasingly violated.
D. Combatant as Fiduciary?
To date, there has not been a groundswell for imposition of a strict
standard per se. The command responsibility cases confronted and rejected
such a categorical approach but have left unclear what kind of negligence
standard applies generally in LOAC's prescriptive zone. Human Rights Watch
and other advocates for the victims of war have called for a higher standard of
care by the United States in light of RMA's promise of precision force.
Scholars such as Schmitt have sensibly written that belligerents will be "held
to the standards to which they are capable of reasonably rising," 116 a
negligence-framed notion warranting further elaboration.
There is not space in this short Note to explore this question fully,
analytically and normatively. It suffices here to direct attention to recent,
promising jus post bellum scholarship and suggest that it could help flesh out
thejus in bellum duty of care I have identified.
In the wake of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, several scholars have argued
that under jus post bellum occupying states bear a duty of care to the citizens
of the countries they govern. In language now familiar to us regarding jus in
bellum and the obligations of individual combatants, Bartram S. Brown wrote
that "elementary considerations of humanity . . . justify imposing a duty of
care on the intervening and occupying states in Iraq. They should take all
reasonable efforts not to leave Iraq in worse shape than before the
intervention."1 7 Noah Feldman did not use the precise terminology "duty of
care" but depicted the relationship of the Coalition and the people of Iraq as
one of trusteeship informed by the principles of agency law.' 18 Although also
subject to the law of negligence and therefore the responsibility to act
reasonably under the circumstances, trustees are subject to afiduciary duty of
care that additionally carries the obligation to act affirmatively in the interests
of beneficiaries.
The rationale for analogizing this fiduciary duty of care from jus post
bellum back to jus in bellum is evident in General MacArthur's statement
upon affirming General Yamashita's sentence to hang: "The soldier, be he
friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the weak and unarmed. It is the
very essence and reason of his being. When he violates this sacred trust, he
not only profanes his entire cult but threatens the fabric of international
society." ' 19 General MacArthur's formulation suggests how this trusteeship
116. Id.
117. Bartram S. Brown, Intervention, Self-Determination, Democracy and the Residual
Responsibilities of the Occupying Power in Iraq, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 23, 49 (2004).
118. NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ 61-91 (2004).
119. Quoted in Smidt, supra note 35, at 166-67.
Precision War and Responsibility
and its fiduciary duty of care 120 would operate: our reasonable combatant is an
agent invested with the authority to act and the honor of the profession of
arms by their principal, their nation, and entrusted with the lives (the ultimate
interests) of noncombatants and soldiers hors d'combat, the third party
beneficiaries that LOAC largely exists to protect. The notion that combatants
owe duties to those near and even at whom they fire is consistent with
international law's increasing recognition of the rights of individuals-and,
more broadly, with our civilization's moral architecture, which recognizes that
with power comes responsibility, and that individuals have moral value
regardless of whether or not they are powerful.
The content of a camouflage-wearing trustee's duty would be similar to
that of his or her pinstripe-wearing counterpart: not to cause no harm to the
beneficiary interests held in trust, but rather not to do so negligently or
intentionally. Toward the end of making decisions in the best interest of their
beneficiaries, combatant trustees would have to meet their duty to inform
themselves to the best of their ability under the circumstances, to inquire
where further investigation is reasonable, and to have in place processes for
making good decisions-in other words, to be reasonably positioned to meet
the Yamashita standard of knowing, or expecting to know of ongoing or
potential LOAC violations. 121 In the context of the enhanced capacity for
knowledge and control of the effects of military violence offered by RMA
systems, judging whether a combatant's decisionmaking was reasonable
logically becomes a question of whether the combatant made use of the
available technology to the extent that an individual with their authority, rank,
training, and experience would use under similar circumstances.
RMA age commanders-seated at CENTCOM or PACOM conference
tables in air-conditioned Tampa or Honolulu office buildings, with time to
plan operations days or months in advance, with highly advanced analytical
structures, and with hundreds of thousands of subordinates-bear more than a
passing resemblance to their civilian executive colleagues. Where war is
waged entirely from the desktop and involves both civilian and military
infrastructure-as in the case of "cyberwar" involving attacks on and defense
of computer systems via viruses and other programs, sent over information
technology infrastructure used primary by civilians and on which information
age societies depend-applying the fiduciary notions of the corporate and
financial worlds may be especially valuable analytically.
As stimulating as the fiduciary duty analogy may be, however, it is far
from perfect. As explained supra, the fog-piercing RMA carries its own re-
120. Another fiduciary duty of care concept from the related but distinct area of business
organizations law is the business judgment rule (BJR), an abstention doctrine under which courts will
not review business decisions made by executives subject to fiduciary duties except inter alia in cases of
self-dealing or wanton negligence. There is theoretical space for suggestion of an analogous "military
judgment rule," albeit one calibrated for LOAC's requirements, the realities of warfare, and notions of
negligence under national codes such as the UCMJ.
121. The Yamashita standard for commanders is generally akin to the standard for reasonable
combatants: "A commander would be responsible only for facts that would have been uncovered if the
commander had fairly pursued an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances." Stryszak, supra note 41,
at 62.
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fogging risks, "recomplicating '1 22 operational and moral decisions for RMA
commanders. Furthermore, the closer one gets to the literal "tip of the spear,"
the less performing a fiduciary duty of care can be held to anything like the
genteel standards of the boardroom. For our reasonable combatants-from
CENTCOM conference rooms to Marine fire teams securing a site under fire
after a nighttime improvised explosive device (IED) attack-circumstances
within the Armed Forces can be quite dissimilar; this is the capacity point
restated. Furthermore, the pressures competing against one's fiduciary duty of
loyalty are many orders of magnitude stronger in the dust, heat, and blood of a
combat zone. An erosion in fire discipline that through our lawyerly
trusteeship/agency 123 lens might look like self-dealing at the expense of one's
obligation to act in the interest of third parties, might in the heat of battle at
the tactical level look like loyalty to one's brothers in arms or simple self-
preservation. 124 At the strategic level of war, we see a similar disconnect of
stakes: Nations generally go to war and thereby take on the trust of those
protected by LOAC because they perceive their national security or existence
is threatened, while trustees in the private sector are retained in the
expectation of payment. Finally, while importing fiduciary notions into
LOAC's duty of care might promise a potential means of fleshing out our
understanding of the criminal negligence in LOAC's prescriptive zone and
responding to public calls for a higher standard of care in the use of force, it
would do so by combining bodies of law - LOAC and fiduciary - which at
least facially have remained separate.
125
The effect of introducing fiduciary notions into LOAC may be to
reinforce emerging customary norms regarding the use of RMA systems, for
example requiring the exclusive use PGMs in urban air operations by nations
that possess them. Schmitt reasons from the discrimination and proportionality
principles that "if guided munitions would lessen the expected loss and
damage [to noncombatants] without increasing the risk to the aircrew or
decreasing the expected damage to the target, and guided munitions are
reasonably available, then the attacking force should employ them."' 126 U.S.
122. The word is borrowed from the title of Charles Dunlap's monograph for the Army War
College. See CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR., TECHNOLOGY AND THE 21ST CENTURY BATTLEFIELD:
RECOMPLICATING MORAL LIFE FOR THE STATESMAN AND THE SOLDIER 12 (1999).
123. There exist important distinctions among simple agency and trustee fiduciary concepts.
For example, in the former, one bears a duty of care to act in the interest of one's principle while taking
care not to harm third parties, but under trusteeship an agent trustee receives instructions from a
principal but acts in the interest of the third party beneficiary. Additional analysis of application of
trusteeship notions tojus in bellum is warranted.
124. Such tendencies reflect a deeper contradiction regarding war itself: for a war to be just it
must be about the interest of civilians generally and the peace to follow, but for it to be successful at the
tactical level it must be about individual soldiers and violence.
125. Although the legal academic literature does not analyze LOAC in terms of imposing a
duty of care, several scholars do argue that other areas of law can helpfully inform our understanding of
LOAC. See, e.g., Stryszak, supra note 41, at 64-67 (finding analogues to the Yamashita "should have
known" knowledge standard in domestic criminal, corporate, agency, and real property law); Martin,
supra note 29 (drawing on human rights law to inform understandings of proportionality and
discrimination under LOAC).
126. Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare, 2 YALE
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 152 (1999). The United States has, to date, resisted the establishment of any
customary rule requiring the use of PGMs on principle, while adhering to the practice in operations. See
WAXMAN, supra note 66, at 13. However, Schmitt's stipulation that the norm would only apply where
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and U.K. combatants are currently required to perform discrimination and
proportionality analyses similar in many respects to the fiduciary duty of
inquiry borne by civilian executives and trustees, and explicit recognition of
an affirmative legal obligation to act in the interest of LOAC's third party
noncombatants could be expected to lead RMA combatants to a conclusion
similar to Schmitt's.
As the U.K. Ministry of Defence observes, "[m]odern, smart weaponry
has increased the options available to the military planner."' 27 However,
application of the proportionality principle is not always straightforward. Sometimes a
method of attack that would minimize the risk to civilians may involve increased risk to
the attacking forces. The law is not clear as to the degree of risk that the attacker must
accept. The proportionality principle does not itself require the attacker to accept
increased risk. Rather, it requires him to refrain from attacks that may be expected to
cause excessive collateral damage. It will be a question of fact whether alternative,
practically possible methods of attack would reduce the collateral risks. If they would, the
attacker may have to accept the increased risk as being the only way of pursuing an attack
in a proportionate way.
28
In other words, a reasonable judgment is required, one in which the risk of
good faith error and unfortunate noncombatant harm is inherent, due to the
inescapable realities of war. Yet under the negligence standard discernable in
the law of war regarding non-intentional harm-including one informed by
fiduciary notions-acting on "reasonable beliefs about the danger to itself and
taking precautions to avoid inflicting disproportionate damage, [one is
generally] absolved of war crime or other legal charges," 129 even if the
unintended harm inflicted in fact is disproportionate to the anticipated or
realized military benefit. Such a "reasonable person approach"'' 30 shares the
virtue of flexibility with the "knew or should have known" command
responsibility-based duty of care associated with Yamashita that informed the
ICTY and ICTR statutes.
VI. ADJUDICATORY PREDICTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
It remains to comment briefly on the outlook for, and theoretical
implications of, adjudication in light of the duty of care.
A. Predictions
First, the nature of the technology revolution cuts both ways. Some
elements of the RMA could make prosecuting negligent acts easier; these
include not only email (which creates splendid electronic "paper trails"), but
also audio intercepts and imagery. 131 With more and better documented
PGMs are "reasonably available" allows commanders substantial latitude to make cost-benefit decisions
regarding competing needs for military resources.
127. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 70, 2.7.
128. Id. 2.71. Another view is that increasing risk to military personnel can alter the
calculation of military value and therefore can change the result of the proportionality balancing test.
129. WAXMAN, supra note 66, at 61.
130. See Stryszak, supra note 41, at 63.
131. Other, less official, sources of electronic information about what military personnel did
and when are also available from the reports and photographs of "embedded" media reporters, and the
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evidence, it would seem to become easier to assemble a case about who made
bad decisions, with what information available, after what efforts to inform
themselves, and when. How easily might one go about prosecuting a negligent
decision made by individuals within a "system of systems," however?
Consider all of the moving parts in just one air strike during Operation Allied
Force:
Over Kosovo . . . a U-2 flying over a suspected target took video and relayed it via
satellite back to the United States. There, analysts determined that the objects captured on
film were Serb military vehicles, fused this information with three-dimensional terrain
data and satellite imagery taken earlier, and generated precise geographic coordinates.
They relayed these coordinates via satellite to orbiting command and control aircraft,
which directed an airborne F-15E strike aircraft to attack. The F-15E then used GPS-
assisted PGMs to knock out the targets. The entire process took place in minutes.1
32
In a war in which tens of thousands of such sorties are flown, unraveling the
dense organizational process that went into a decision and identifying
negligent actors is certain to be a daunting task. An additional complication is
that the records of allegedly negligent sorties would be in the possession of
the nation whose personnel are presumably being prosecuted. Nations with
advanced military hardware (and software) also happen to be those with the
most power in the international system generally.'
33
A second general prediction is that any prosecutions for negligence are
likely to be handled at the national level or via courts-martial. This is because
of the practical matter of limited international forum availability, U.S. policy
against subjecting its personnel to prosecution in international fora, 34 and the
precedent of its rejection regarding command responsibility by the ICTY and
ICTR. This suggests a further-and, I believe, quite safe-prediction: though
a duty of care is evident in the law of war, and extends beyond LOAC's
proscriptive core of intentional war crimes, internationally prosecutable
negligence would assuredly have to occur on a systematic or widespread
basis, as occurred in World War II, Yugoslavia, or Rwanda, to be prosecuted
internationally. Far more likely is duty of care analysis informing prosecutions
in courts-martial arising from collateral damage incidents and friendly fire
incidents.
In an influential article before the ICTR and ICTY appellate decisions,
Michael Smidt advocated the Yamashita "should have known" standard of
command responsibility, rather than the more lenient actual knowledge
standard employed in the prosecution of Captain Ernest Medina, commander
of the company carried out the My Lai massacre in Vietnam. Smidt suggested
command responsibility prosecution of U.S. personnel under Article 18 of the
UCMJ, which provides U.S. courts-martial jurisdiction to try war crimes
email, blog postings, and digital photographs and videos created by troops themselves. For example, the
infamous picture of a prisoner at Abu Ghraib prison shrouded in black standing on a box and hooked up
to electrodes was taken by a soldier with a personal imaging device. Other similar digital pictures were
introduced as evidence in prosecutions stemming from the mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib.
132. Meilinger, supra note 98, at 15. Note that the Kosovo war was eight years ago; the
complexity of U.S. military operations has only increased.
133. For one of the few scholarly explorations of this issue, see Laura Moranchek, Prosecuting
War Crimes While Protecting National Security Information, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 477 (2006).
134. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, para. 507 (July 1956).
Precision War and Responsibility
under customary international law. 135 This is a change from U.S. military
policy not to charge American service members with crimes under
international LOAC but rather under the UCMJ's punitive articles. 136
Although international criminal negligence doctrine is arguably too undefined
at present to support courts-martial under that authority alone, here again, duty
of care analysis might inform prosecutions for negligence in the use of RMA
systems under the UCMJ's punitive or general articles.
B. Implications: Transnational Norm Diffusion
Rather than evidence of weakness in the LOAC regime, domestic court-
martial proceedings being informed by an international legal norm is broadly
consistent with the transnational legal process of norm diffusion identified by
scholars of the New Haven School of International Law.
While scholars of international law have noted for some time the
horizontal diffusion of legal norms among nations, transnational legal process
theory's distinct improvement is the addition of a vertical element, one that
recognizes the interaction of national and transnational actors and bodies of
law in "a process of norm-internalization."' 137 Although one of Harold Hongju
Koh's most notable explications of the theory focuses on how this norm-
internalization process can lead nations to comply with international law, 38 an
earlier seminal piece makes clear that the idea has broad utility.' 39 Indeed, one
can conceive of transnational law's central process more generally as one of
"up, across, down" norm diffusion. Legal norms that emerge at the national
level reach the international level through interaction among national and
transnational actors, at which point the norm is recognized through a
transnational actor's interpretation and "enunciation of the global norm,"' 4 0
one which is brought back down to the national level as nations act to
internalize the global norm.
14 1
This process is readily apparent regarding the duty of care. Negligence
was a facet of municipal and national military law before being recognized by
the post-World War II national and international war crimes tribunals, which
employed the theory to hold German and Japanese commanders responsible
for atrocities. Again, negligence was nowhere mentioned in the statutes which
set up the post-World War II tribunals; judges imported the norm in its
135. UCMJ, art. 18 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 818); see also Smidt, supra note 35, at 194-97,
219-33.
136. Smidt, supra note 35, at 215. Usually, regarding "members of one's own forces, there is
no need to charge war crimes; every army is subject to its own system of law and normally has a penal
code based on ordinary municipal law." LESLIE C. GREEN, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR 245
(1999). The UCMJ's punitive articles are Articles 77-134 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 77-134).
137. OONA A. HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND POLITICS 191 (2005).
138. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599
(1997) (book review).
139. "Transnational legal process describes the theory and practice of how public and private
actors ... interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and international fora, to make, interpret,
enforce, and ultimately internalize rules of transnational law." Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal
Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181, 183-84 (1996).
140. Koh, supra note 138, at 2646.
141. Id.
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entirety from the national level. In recent years, ad hoc international criminal
tribunals again have grappled with the notion in holding commanders
responsible for the actions of their underlings, demonstrating the ability of the
negligence norm to move laterally at the international level. Notions of
negligence logically require the existence of a duty of care, one that can be
seen in Protocol I and is apparent in the way in which, through their military
guidelines, numerous nations have given expression to LOAC's stipulations of
necessity, discrimination, proportionality, and humanity. Here, we see both
additional lateral movement of the norm at the international level, and
incorporation of it at the national level, respectively. The "up, across, down"
transnational legal process thus has already run a full cycle.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, some have
questioned or even bemoaned the future ofjus in bellum. Although certainly
challenged by the Bush Administration's efforts to circumvent the Geneva
Conventions regarding detainees, LOAC in general has, if anything, become
more important. Just a few years ago, in the wake of the Kosovo war, one
scholar reasonably observed that political pressures due to concern about
collateral damage "may reduce operational flexibility more severely than does
adherence to international law." 142 For at least the first several years after
9/11, however, the politics of war in the United States arguably were less
restrictive than the laws of war. In light of this circumstantial salience,
LOAC's alignment with our national security interest in avoiding collateral
damage, 143 LOAC's deeper significance as a reflection of the moral values
and commitments of civilized nations even in the desperate hour of war,144
and therefore the ultimate "link between the conduct of the forces ... and the
perceived continued legitimacy of the action itself,"'145 it is worth considering
carefully calls for the United States and other nations with advanced militaries
to adhere to a higher standard in complying with LOAC.
As I have explained, there is a duty of care inherent in the law of war,
one discernable even in contentious international command responsibility
jurisprudence. The roots of this negligence-based duty in treaty sources and
national practice are clear. Responsibility for the effects of attacks logically
varies with control over them, and consequently the scope of unintended
effects a reasonable combatant may legally inflict on those whom the law of
war protects varies with technological capacity and other circumstances.
Although the fiduciary duties of trustees may help flesh out scholastic and
practitioner understanding of LOAC's duty of care, the notion that great
142. WAXMAN, supra note 66, at xi.
143. Every collateral damage incident-such as the accidental killing of a family of twelve in
an air strike in Baiji mentioned at the outset of this Note-makes it easier for anti-U.S. forces to argue
that it is the United States, not them, who are the cause of the suffering of Iraqis.
144. "The moral imperative and relevance of [LOAC] is more apparent today than before
September 11, 2001. Law distinguishes democratic societies from the terrorists who attack them .... "
James E. Baker, LBJ's Ghost: A Contextual Approach to Targeting Decisions and the Commander in
Chief 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 407, 407 (2003).
145. Smidt, supra note 35, at 163.
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power demands great responsibility ought not be read to require a duty of
perfection. Strict liability in the use of legal weapons against legitimate targets
is unrealistic and would undermine the LOAC regime. Such a form of liability
would ultimately endanger LOAC's purpose: "the minimization of violence,
the maintenance of minimum order, and as approximate an achievement of the
policies of human dignity as each situation allows."
'146
146. Reisman, supra note 10, at 83.
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